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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. 
This case is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Jeffery F. Ward 
and Jon Q. Ward (the "Wards"). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction. 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR 
APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Issue Presented for Appeal: 
Did the trial court correctly rule that a specific deed call to a monument controls over 
a course and distance call? 
Standards for Appellate Review: 
Mahan Khalsa ("Khalsa") appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for 
summaryjudgment and its ruling in favor of the Wards' cross-motion for summaryjudgment. 
A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan 
v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Utah 1991). 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES, 
The following are the determinative statutes and rules implicated by Khalsa's appeal: 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102(1); 
B. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e). 
See Addendum Exhibit A, which is a copy of this statute and rule. 
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~ STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
I he Wards purchased a certain parcel n| hud lm,\itnl in Midway, 1 lluh (Hie "Watd 
Parcel") froi i 11 loi r i,ei Ellsworth ("Ellsworth") on July 4, 1.978 by means of a Uniform Real 
Estate Purchase Contract ("Ellsworth Contract"). [Record <>n Appeal ("R ") 222, 
Memorandum Decision at f 3.] Immediately after purchasing the Ward Parcel from 
Ellsworti ,•• nossessioi t of tl le land i ip t : • tl le Epperson Ditcl i [R 222, 
Mem< * < <* > jisioii ai % J.J The Wards have occupied, farmed, and cultivated the Ward 
Parcel continuously since 1978, planting crops of hay, alfalfa, or grain annually. [R. 132, 
Wards' Statement of Undisputed Facts ai n
 Sl /ards recorded the Ellsw on « . M • • 
I - ; - * • • • on1, * i s •* . icinig 
installment payments under the Ellsworth Contract, the Wards recorded a warranty deed on 
April 15,1987 [K, 157, Affidavit of Jon Q. Ward (Jon Ward Affidavit") at t1f 11 12; R 
144, Affidavit of Jeffery F. Ward ("Jeff Ward Affidavit") at 1H| 11 i i ] 
I he eastern boundary of (hr W:n*d Piinvl is described m Itnfh (lie Ellsworth Contract 
and the Wards' warranty deed as running "along a ditch." [R. 222, Memorandum Decision 
at Tflf 3-4.] It is undisputed that the ditch referred to in the legal description is the Epperson 
Ditch | R 222, Memorandum Decision at J^ 4 | line bppcisnn I >il< li • n " • m irrigation 
cim . ^ • . urse for at least 65 years. [R. 157, Jon "W ard 
Affidavit at ^ 14; R. 145, Jeff Ward Affidavit at ^ 13.] When the Wards negotiated the 
purchase of the Ward Parcel with Ellsworth in 1978, they agreed that the boundary would be 
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the Epperson Ditch. [R. 158, Jon Ward Affidavit at f 6; R. 146, Jeff Ward Affidavit at ^  6.] 
The Epperson Ditch has represented the historical and natural boundary between the Ward 
Parcel and Ellsworth's remaining land. [R. 157, Jon Ward Affidavit at f 14; R. 145, Jeff 
Ward Affidavit at^j 13.] For example, the natural slope of the land from west to east required 
that only property to the east of the Epperson Ditch could be irrigated with water from it. 
Because the Wards own additional property to the west, they irrigated all of the land west of 
the Epperson Ditch using water from another irrigation canal on their property. [R. 157-56, 
Jon Ward Affidavit at ff 15-16; R. 145-44, Jeff Ward Affidavit at ffl[ 14-15.] 
Khalsa purchased a parcel of property in 1999 that shares the eastern border with the 
Ward Parcel. [R. 221, Memorandum Decision at f 10.] The course and distance calls in both 
the Wards' and Khalsa's legal descriptions start and end at the Epperson Ditch. The only 
difference is that the eastern boundary of the Ward Parcel is described as "along a ditch", 
while the western boundary of Khalsa's warranty deed omits the call to "along a ditch" and 
describes a straight line. [R. 222-21, Memorandum at ^ 3 and 10.] 
In May 2002, Khalsa, without any warning or explanation, entered onto the Ward 
Parcel and destroyed a fence that had been constructed in 1990 that ran along the Epperson 
ditch. [R. 222, Memorandum Decision at ^ J 6.] Plaintiff caused a new fence to be constructed 
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that encroached on the Ward Parcel. Consistent with their long-term ownership and 
occupation of the Ward Parcel, the Wards removed Khalsa's newly constructed fence.1 
Thereafter, Khalsa initiated this Lawsuit claiming that he was entitled to a declaration 
that he is the owner of a small strip of property (approximately Vi acre) that lies on the 
western side of the Epperson ditch. The Wards counterclaimed seeking to quiet title in the 
Epperson Ditch as the boundary between their properties based on the plain language of the 
legal description contained in the Ellsworth Contract and their warranty deed and by 
operation of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition of the Trial Court: 
Khalsa moved for summary judgment arguing that he was entitled to a declaration 
quieting title in the disputed property based on a recent survey showing the "course bearings 
and distances" described in Khalsa's warranty deed calls for a straight line just west of the 
Epperson Ditch. [R. 83, Affidavit of Bing Christensen ("Christensen Affidavit") at % 5] 
The Wards opposed Khalsa's motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment 
based on the well-established rule of deed construction that the specific deed call to and 
along the Epperson Ditch controls over any conflicting call by course and distance. The 
The parties asserted competing claims for trespass. The Wards also asserted a 
counterclaim to quiet title to an easement across Khalsa's property. Those claims have been 
settled by the parties. Therefore, the sole issue before this Court relates to the competing 
quiet title claims of the boundary dispute. 
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Wards also argued that issues of fact on their counterclaim for boundary by acquiescence 
precluded summary judgment in favor of Khalsa. 
The trial court issued a memorandum decision granting the Wards' cross-motion and 
denying Khalsa's motion for summary judgment. [R. 232-224, Memorandum Decision.] 
The trial court found in its ruling that the call to and along the Epperson Ditch controls the 
boundary location. The trial court further ruled that because of the Wards' prior recording 
and their long term possession of land up to the Epperson Ditch, Khalsa was on notice of the 
Wards' ownership. On January 30,2004, the trial court entered a Final Judgment and Quiet 
Title Decree, quieting title to the Wards in the center line of the Epperson Ditch. [R. 256-53, 
Final Judgment and Quiet Title Decree.] 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
The following is a summary of the Wards' Statement of Undisputed Facts and 
Response to Khalsa's Statement of Facts, that were set forth in its memorandum in support 
of its motion for summary judgment, and unreflited by Khalsa: 
1. The Wards purchased the Ward parcel from Homer Ellsworth ("Ellsworth") 
on July 4, 1978 by means of a Uniform Real Estate Purchase Contract ("Ellsworth 
Contract"). The Ellsworth Contract was signed by Ellsworth and conveyed the following 
described parcel: 
Commencing at a point located South 13.88 feet (4.23 meters) and West 
2320.67 feet (707.34 meters) from the South one-quarter corner of Section 3, 
Township 4 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
98°55f45" West along a fence line 361.52 feet (110.19 meters); thence North 
00°09f22" East along a fence line 674.12 feet (205.47 meters); thence North 
89°55f0r East along a fence line 453.38 feet (138.19 meters); thence South 
07°54f36" West along a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to the point of 
beginning. 
(emphasis added). A copy of the Ellsworth Contract was recorded at the Wasatch County 
Recorder's Office as Entry No. 120840, Book 135, pages 344-46, on September 12, 1980. 
[R. 159, Jon Ward Affidavit at fflf 2-4; R. 147, Jeff Ward Affidavit at ffl[ 2-4.] 
2. The eastern boundary of the Wards' legal description calls to the eastern 
boundary of the Ward Parcel as being "along a ditch", which is the Epperson Ditch. When 
the Wards negotiated the transaction in 1978, they agreed with Ellsworth that the eastern 
boundary of the property would be the Epperson Ditch. [R. 158, Jon Ward Affidavit at f 7; 
R. 146, Jeff Ward Affidavit at | 7.] 
3. The Epperson Ditch is a large irrigation ditch and is a clear physical barrier 
between the Ward Parcel and the adjacent parcel retained by Ellsworth. [R. 157, Jon Ward 
Affidavit at f 14; R. 145, Jeff Ward Affidavit at f 13.] 
4. The Epperson Ditch has existed in its current state for at least 65 years and has 
not moved or changed course during that time. [R. 157, Jon Ward Affidavit at ^ f 14; R. 145, 
Jeff Ward Affidavit at f 13.] 
5. Since July 4,1978, the Wards have occupied their property up to western edge 
of the Epperson ditch. Every year since 1978, the Wards have tilled the soil, planted and 
harvested their crops, driven tractors and other farm equipment up to the Epperson Ditch. 
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[R. 158-57, Jon Ward Affidavit at fflf 8 and 14; R. 146-45, Jeff Ward Affidavit at t1f 8 and 
13.] 
6. The Ward Parcel and the adjacent property slope from west to east. Thus, 
only properties to the east of the Epperson Ditch traditionally were irrigated with water from 
the Epperson Ditch. [R. 157-56, Jon Ward Affidavit at Iff 15-16; R. 145-44, Jeff Ward 
Affidavit at ff 14-15.] 
7. All of the property to the west (i.e., the Ward property - owned by the Ward 
family for over 65 years) is irrigated by another irrigation ditch to the west, known as the 
West Bench Ditch. [R. 157-56, Jon Ward Affidavit at f 15; R. 145, Jeff Ward Affidavit at 
114-] 
8. Essentially, property to the west of the Epperson Ditch was useless to Ellsworth 
because he could not irrigate property to the west because of the nature slope of the land to 
the east. Moreover, the Epperson Ditch was a natural impediment to Ellsworth's use and 
enjoyment of land west of the ditch. [R. 156, Jon Ward Affidavit at ^ f 16; R. 144, Jeff Ward 
Affidavit at f 15.] 
9. Consistent with their ownership of the property up to the Epperson Ditch, in 
approximately 1990, Wards constructed a fence along the western border of the Epperson 
Ditch. [R. 156, Jon Ward Affidavit at f 17; R. 144, Jeff Ward Affidavit at % 16.] 
10. In 1999, Khalsa purchased his tract of land that shared a common border with 
the Wards and recorded a warranty deed on June 1,1999. The legal description in Khalsa's 
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warranty deed omits any reference to the Epperson Ditch. [R. 221, Memorandum Decision 
at 110.] 
11. The course and distance calls in both the Wards' and Khalsa' s warranty deeds 
are identical on their common border in that they both start and end at the same point - the 
Epperson Ditch. The only difference between the two legal descriptions is that the Wards' 
legal description goes "along the ditch" while Khalsa's calls for a straight line. [R. 222-21, 
Memorandum Decision at H 3 and 10; see Illustrative Drawing Below] 
^Sr~~ 
s 
w 1 
WARD PARCEL 
iP^ps^g-^^^^^ * Line by Distance and Bearing 
* Line Along Epperson Ditch 
N 
KHALSA PARCEL 
For Illustrative Purposes Only 
E Not to Scale 
12. The fence constructed on the boundary of the Epperson Ditch by the Wards in 
1990 was undisturbed until May of 2002, when Khalsa destroyed the fence without prior 
warning or explanation. [R. 222, Memorandum Decision at f 6; R. 156, Jon Ward Affidavit 
at 117-19; R. 144, Jeff Ward Affidavit at ] 16-18.] 
13. In November 2001, Khalsa commissioned Bing Christensen ("Christensen") 
to survey the property "according to the course bearings and distances reported in their 
respective legal descriptions." [R. 83, Christensen Affidavit at^ f 5]; see also [R. 130-29, The 
Wards' Response to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at ff 8-10.] Christensen never states in 
his affidavit filed in support of Khalsa's motion for summary judgment that he plotted the 
Ward Parcel boundary according to the legal description contained in the Wards' warranty 
deed, only that he plotted the boundary according to the "course bearings and distances", thus 
ignoring the specific call to "along a ditch". [R. 83, See Christensen Affidavit generally.] 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
This Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Wards quieting title to the center of the Epperson Ditch, The undisputed evidence 
establishes that when the Wards purchased the Ward Parcel from Ellsworth on July 4,1978, 
they agreed to establish the Epperson Ditch as the eastern boundary of their property. The 
language of legal description, topography of the property, and historical use and possession 
all support the trial court's ruling. Indeed, the trial court correctly recognized that under the 
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undisputed facts of this case, the call to the Epperson Ditch controls over the bearing and 
distance calls and acreage reference. Khalsa's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. 
First, Khalsa's reliance upon the language of his own legal description is misplaced. 
Because the Wards recorded the Ellsworth Contract nearly twenty years before Khalsa 
purchased his property, his interest is junior to any conflicting interest of the Wards. 
Second, the Christensen Affidavit filed in support of Khalsa's motion for summary 
judgment does nothing to support his argument on appeal, because Christensen admittedly 
only plotted the "course bearings and distances" in the Wards' legal description and did not 
give effect to the call to the Epperson Ditch. 
Third, fundamental cannons of deed construction require that where there is a conflict 
between a call to a monument as a boundary and a call by course and distance, the monument 
call prevails. 
Fourth, the cases oiMahas v. Rindlisbacher, 808 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1990), Williams v. 
Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978), and Scott v. Hansen, 422 P.2d 525 (Utah 1966), are all 
directly on point and cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way. The precedent created 
by these decisions is stated succinctly as follows - "Fixed monuments or markers of a 
permanent nature which can be definitely identified and located take precedence over calls 
of courses and distance, or plats, or amounts of acreage." Scott v. Hansen, All P.2d 525, 
527-28 (Utah 1966). The trial court properly relied upon these cases. 
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Fifth, Khalsa's assignment of error based upon an argument that the Wards' legal 
description fails to close is untimely and unsupported by any evidence. Khalsa failed to raise 
this argument below, and presented no evidence to the trial court to support this assertion. 
Sixth, Khalsa's suggestion that the Court should find issues of fact relating to the 
intention of the parties, if it decides to uphold the trial court's ruling, is similarly misguided. 
Khalsa himself moved for summary judgment based upon the plain language of the legal 
descriptions. Moreover, he failed to dispute any of the material issues of fact set forth in the 
Wards' Statement of Undisputed Facts. Therefore, the trial court appropriately found no 
issues of fact precluding summary judgment. 
Finally, should the Court decide to reverse the trial court's decision for whatever 
reason, summary judgment in favor of Khalsa is inappropriate because the Wards should be 
allowed to present evidence of boundary by acquiescence. Indeed, the Wards have occupied 
the land up to the Epperson Ditch for over 25 years. Thus, even if the Court disagrees with 
the trial court's ruling, the Wards should have the opportunity to prove their boundary by 
acquiescence counterclaim. 
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VII. ARGUMENT. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CALL TO 
THE EPPERSON DITCH IN THE WARDS9 LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
CONTROLS OVER ANY CONFLICTING CALLS BY COURSE AND 
DISTANCE. 
In granting the Wards' cross-motion for summary judgment the trial court held that 
"Utah case law is clear on the issue of whether reference to a monument or marker will 
prevail over a conflicting metes and bounds description." [R. 229, Memorandum Decision.] 
Specifically, the court found that the call to the Epperson Ditch in the Wards' legal 
description controls over the conflicting course and distance description that references a 
straight line. [R. 228-27, Memorandum Decision.] 
Khalsa seeks to have this Court ignore the call to "along a ditch" in the Wards' legal 
description and quiet title to him based upon his legal description that omits any reference 
to the Epperson Ditch. Khalsa's arguments, however, are contrary to Utah law and the 
undisputed evidence in the record, and this Court should uphold the trial court's ruling in 
favor of the Wards. 
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A. Khalsa's Legal Description is Irrelevant Because He Had Notice of 
the Wards' Ownership of the Property up to the Epperson Ditch 
Pursuant to the Prior Recorded Contract and Warranty Deed. 
Khalsa correctly notes that the principal intent of the rules of deed construction is to 
give effect to the intention of the parties. See, e.g. Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 2 ("The primary 
function of a trial court resolving a boundary dispute is to ascertain the intent of the parties 
at the time of the original subdivision of a tract of land.") Khalsa claims, however, that the 
trial court erred when "it ignored the intent of the grantor of the two warranty deeds." [Pg. 6, 
Brief of Appellee.] Khalsa mistakenly refers to the legal description contained in his own 
warranty deed, dated May 28, 1999, as evidence of the grantor's intent. Utah Code Ann. § 
57-3-102(1) provides that a document affecting interest in real estate "from the time of 
recording with the appropriate county recorder, [shall] impart notice to all persons of their 
contents." The Wards' purchased their property on July 4,1978 using a standard form of the 
Uniform Real Estate Purchase Contract. [R. 222, Memorandum Decision at If 2.] The 
Ellsworth Contract describes the eastern boundary as "thence South 07°54f36ff West along 
a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to the point of beginning" (emphasis added). [R. 222, 
Memorandum Decision at Tf 3.] The Wards duly recorded the Ellsworth Contract, thus 
imparting notice to Khalsa and his predecessors of the Wards' interest in the property as it 
ran along the Epperson Ditch. [R. 222, Memorandum Decision at If 2.] Indeed, the 1978 sale 
from Ellsworth to the Wards was the first subdivision of this property and the Wards were 
the first to purchase and record any sale of property from Ellsworth. 
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In Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, the Utah Supreme Court expressly 
held that an earlier recorded notice of purchase had priority over a subsequently recorded 
deed. 523 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1974). In Wilson, the plaintiff recorded a notice of a real estate 
purchase in April 1965. The defendant recorded his deed in November 1965. The plaintiffs 
and defendant's legal descriptions overlapped by more than two acres. The court ruled as 
follows: "Plaintiffs having recorded their notice of purchase prior to the recording of 
defendant's deed, the defendant becomes the subsequent purchaser and is deemed to take 
with notice of the plaintiffs interest." Id. at 1227. Thus, even though the two legal 
descriptions described a portion of the same property, the plaintiff prevailed because he 
recorded notice of his purchase first. 
Similarly, the Wards' recorded the Ellsworth Contract and their warranty deed years 
before Khalsa purchased his property and recorded his warranty deed. Hence, Khalsa is the 
subsequent purchaser and his rights are junior to any conflicting rights of the Wards. The 
only issue before this Court is whether the proper construction of the language contained in 
the Wards' legal describes a boundary that runs along the Epperson Ditch, or in a straight 
line. Whatever Khalsa's legal description says is irrelevant, because Ellsworth could not 
convey to Khalsa or his predecessors what he had already conveyed to the Wards. The trial 
court correctly looked to the language contained in the Wards' legal description to determine 
the respective ownership rights of the parties. 
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B, Khalsa's Reliance Upon the Affidavit and Survey ofBing 
Christensen is Misplaced. 
Khalsa refers to the Affidavit ofBing Christensen in support of his argument that the 
trial court erred in quieting title to the Wards. Indeed, the only basis upon which Khalsa 
asserted he was entitled to summary judgment was that Christensen had conducted a survey 
that showed "the course bearings and distances reported in their respective legal 
descriptions" ran in a straight line just to the west of the Epperson Ditch. [R. 83, Christensen 
Affidavit at f 5.] By his own admission, however, Christensen only plotted the "course 
bearings and distances" and did not give any effect to the call to "along a ditch" in the 
Wards' legal description. [R. 83, Christensen Affidavit at f^ 5.] 
No where does Christensen attest that he attempted to give effect to the call to the 
Epperson Ditch in the Wards' legal description. [R. 83, Christensen Affidavit.] Thus, he 
reaches his conclusions, only by ignoring the call to "along a ditch" in the Wards' legal 
description. Christensen's affidavit, therefore, does nothing to support Khalsa's claim that 
the grantor's intent was not to create the Epperson Ditch as the boundary to the property sold 
to the Wards in 1978. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted Utah Law When it Ruled 
That the Call along the Epperson Ditch Controls, 
The trial court correctly interpreted Utah law, finding that the call to "along a ditch" 
takes precedence over a conflict of courses or distances. [R. 229-28, Memorandum 
Decision.] Khalsa argues that the trial court misinterpreted the rules of construction and 
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Utah case law by not ignoring the call to the Epperson Ditch in the Wards' legal description. 
Khalsa misinterprets the decisions of Utah courts and applicable rules of interpretation. 
1. Fundamental Principles of Deed Construction Require That 
the Court Give Effect to Monument Calls. 
Khalsa acknowledges the well-established rule that "[w]here the calls for locations 
of boundaries to land are inconsistent, other things being equal, resort is first had to natural 
objects or landmarks, next to artificial monuments, then to adjacent boundaries (which are 
considered a sort of monument), and thereafter to courses and distances." 12 Am. Jur. 2d. 
Boundaries at § 61 (emphasis added). "Natural objects, artificial monuments, and adjacent 
boundaries,... will ordinarily, in the case of conflict in the description of boundaries to land, 
control all other calls." 12 Am. Jur. 2d. Boundaries § 63; see also 12 Am. Jur. 2d. 
Boundaries § 71 (Courses and Distances) ("In the case of conflicting descriptions, courses 
and distances are controlled by and must yield to monuments whether natural or artificial.") 
Khalsa attempts to characterize the language in the Wards' legal description as 
following within some exception to this cannon of deed construction. The exceptions relied 
upon by Khalsa, however, are wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case. First, Khalsa cites 
the Utah cases ofNeeley v. Kelsch, and Hancock v. Planned Development Corporation for 
the proposition that general references are controlled by specific descriptions. See 600 P.2d 
979 (Utah 1979) and 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990). The legal descriptions in both Neeley and 
Hancock are markedly different from that contained in the Wards' legal description, and 
therefore, these cases are inapposite. 
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In Neeley, a metes and bounds legal description was followed by the general 
statement: "The parcel consists of all land lying north of the County Road which, in actuality, 
is approximately 15 acres instead of 22 acres." Id, at 980. Importantly, there was no call to 
a monument as a boundary within the legal description. See id. The metes and bounds 
description, however, failed to include several parcels north of the county road that the 
grantor owned. See id. The court noted that the "general description" to "all land lying north 
of the County Road" was "meant only to affirm the land described by metes and bounds lay 
north of the road." Id, at 982 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court ruled that even 
though the trial court originally ruled that there was a mutual mistake between the original 
grantor and grantee, the deed should not be reformed to include all of the original grantor's 
land north of the county road. Thus, the court affirmed ownership consistent with the metes 
and bounds description, because in this limited situation "the specific description in chains 
and degrees prevails over the general references to the location of a boundary." Id. at 982 
(emphasis added). 
Conversely, the Ward legal description does not contain a "general" reference to an 
area as in Neeley, but rather a specific call to the eastern boundary of the Ward Parcel as 
"along" the Epperson Ditch. The fact that the Neeley Court found a metes and bounds 
description controlling over the general reference to the statement of "all land lying north of 
the country road" outside of the main body of the legal description does not create an 
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exception from the general rule applicable to this case that calls to specific monuments as 
boundaries control conflicting course and distance calls. 
Similarly, Hancock v. Planned Development Corporation is inapposite. 791 P.2d 183. 
In Hancock, the issue was whether an exception contained in the plaintiff s metes and bounds 
legal description enclosed a disputed strip of land when the conveyance stated it was "subject 
to a fence line encroachment along east line." Id. at 184-85. The court ruled that the 
exception did not limit the metes and bounds description because the words "subject to" are 
commonly associated with attempts to give notice of potential encumbrances and not as 
means of "diminishing the quantum of the estate granted." Id. at 186. Clearly, the legal 
description in Hancock did not reference the "fence line encroachment" for the purpose of 
defining the boundary of the property, but only for the purpose of giving the grantee notice 
of a potential encumbrance. The Wards' legal description contains no such limitation, 
referring specifically to the Epperson Ditch as the eastern boundary of the Ward Parcel. 
Likewise, the exceptions relied upon by Khalsa in the American Jurisprudence treatise 
deal with entirely different factual situations, and thus, are not persuasive. For instance, 
Section 61, after stating the rule that monuments control conflicting course and distance 
descriptions, provides that "[w]here, however, it is apparent that a mistake exists with respect 
to the calls, an inferior means of location may control a higher one." 12 Am. Jur. Boundaries 
§61 . Although this statement is not explained, the case oiNeeley v. Kelsch is cited as 
providing an example of this exception. As previously noted, the clear mistake in Neeley was 
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the general reference to "all land lying north of the county road" while all of the land north 
of the county road was not included within the legal description. The Neeley decision did 
not consider the issue in this case - whether a specific call to a monument as a boundary 
controls a conflicting course and distance call. Thus, in this limited situation where a course 
and distance call conflicts with a general reference to a monument, "an inferior means of 
location may control a higher one." The Wards' legal description contains a specific call to 
the Epperson Ditch as a boundary, and therefore, controls. 
Likewise, Khalsa's reliance upon the exception noted in Section 64 of the American 
Jurisprudence treatise on Boundaries is misplaced. It provides in its entirety as follows: 
Courses and distances and other inferior calls may control monuments 
and natural objects in cases of clear mistake, where the calls for monuments 
are inconsistent with each other, or where some other sufficient reason exists 
for disregarding the general rule, as where it is apparent from the instrument 
that boundaries are to be determined by means of location other than the 
monument, or where the location of the monuments is inaccurate. 
Courses and distances may be used as guides by which to find natural 
objects or to determine, in cases of doubt, which of two or more natural objects 
is the one intended. In other words, they may explain latent ambiguities. 
The doctrine that monuments prevail over courses and distances is 
never adhered to where it would lead to an absurdity or where it would defeat 
a grant when, by rejecting a call for one or more monuments, the deed may be 
upheld and the manifest intent of the parties made effectual. 
12 Am. Jur. 2d. Boundaries § 64. As expressly stated within, the exceptions noted in Section 
64 are intended to deal with instances where there is a conflict between more than one 
monuments or the location of a monument is uncertain. In those limited situations, courts 
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may rely upon course and distances descriptions to assist in determining the location of a 
monument or to correct a clear mistake. In this case, however, there is no conflict between 
different monument calls, and there is no dispute about the location of the Epperson Ditch. 
[R. 221, Memorandum Decision at fflf 4-6.] Moreover, there is no other compelling evidence 
that requires this Court to disregard the well-established rule. 
In this case, disregarding the call to the Epperson Ditch would result in an absurdity. 
Indeed, the undisputed evidence establishes that because of the natural topography of the 
land, the area above the Epperson Ditch was useless to Ellsworth because not only did the 
ditch provide an obvious obstacle to his use and enjoyment of the small sliver of farm land, 
but he had no means of irrigating the land to the west of the Epperson Ditch. [R. 157-56, Jon 
Ward Affidavit at fflf 15-16; R. 145-44, Jeff Ward Affidavit at fflf 13-15.] It is inconceivable 
that under these facts Ellsworth would have carved out a small sliver of property 680* long 
on the opposite side of the Epperson Ditch from his remaining property that he could not 
irrigate. Indeed, disregarding the call to "along a ditch" would create an artificial boundary 
where a long standing monument boundary has existed for over 65 years. [R. 157, Jon Ward 
Affidavit at % 14; R. 145, Jeff Ward Affidavit at <f 13.] This is clearly not the purpose of the 
exception noted in Section 64 of the treatise. 
Next, Khalsa cites Section 62 in support of his position. 
In determining boundaries of a tract of land, it is not permissible to 
disregard any of the calls if they can be applied and harmonized in any 
reasonable manner, but if there is an actual contradiction between the calls in 
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the description of land, so that they are irreconcilable, the court may reject or 
disregard the one which is false or mistaken. 
Calls which cannot be complied with because they are vague or 
repugnant may be rejected or controlled by other material calls which are 
consistent and certain. And an inconsistent call should be disregarded if 
thereby all the rest of the calls are reconcilable and the description perfected. 
12 Am. Jur. 2d. Boundaries § 62. Khalsa argues that if the call to the Epperson Ditch is 
ignored, then the rest of the legal description is harmonized. This argument, however, begs 
the question of which call should be prevail - the call to the Epperson Ditch or the course and 
distance call for a straight line. Again, there is nothing vague or uncertain about the call 
along the Epperson Ditch. A conflict arises when the physical line of the ditch is compared 
with the course and distance call that references a straight line just to the west of the 
Epperson Ditch. Because the conflict arises not from the call along the Epperson Ditch but 
from an inferior inconsistent course and distance call, the monument call controls. 
Finally, Khalsa relies upon Laflin Borough v. Yatesville Borough, a 1979 Pennsylvania 
case. 422 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Commonw. Ct.). In Laflin Borough, a lower court judge described 
the issue as follows: 
The difficulty arises from an additional element in the metes and 
bounds description: a call for the northeastern boundary of Laflin to adjoin the 
southwestern boundary of Yatesville. If this call is respected, the remaining 
parts of the description cannot be satisfied inasmuch as the total acreage of 
Laflin would increase, and three segments of the metes and bounds description 
would be altered by several hundred feet each. Moreover, the charter's 
designation of the lots to be encompassed within Laflin's boundaries would no 
longer be accurate; to reach the Yatesville border, Laflin would also have to 
include a large segment of lot twenty-five. 
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Id, at 1187. Moreover, after examining the evidence the commission found that the intention 
of Laflin's incorporators was to establish the boundary at the dividing line between Lots Nos. 
1 and 25, and the "call to adjoin the Yatesville's southwestern boundary was based on the 
incorporators' erroneous assumption that Yatesville then extended to that dividing line 
between lots." Id, at 1189. Based upon the specific facts of that case, the Laflin court found 
that it was appropriate to deviate from the rule that a call to a boundary as an adjoinder must 
govern an inconsistent metes and bounds call. Id? The facts of the Laflin Borough case are 
clearly not the facts of this case. The Wards' legal description calls to an actual visible 
monument that represents a natural and historical boundary between the two properties rather 
than another town's invisible boundary line. Also, the deviation between the Epperson Ditch 
and the course and distance call is a minor deviation involving a small sliver of property, 
while the Laflin legal description needed to be substantially modified on three sides by 
hundreds of feet to conform to the adjoining boundary call. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that the call to the Epperson Ditch was based upon a mistaken assumption of another 
boundary line as in Laflin case. In short, there is nothing in the Pennsylvania Laflin decision 
that requires this Court to overturn years of Utah jurisprudence and the well reasoned trial 
court opinion. 
2
"The certain and locative calls of adjoining landowners are treated as a sort of natural 
monument, although not so decisive as other natural monuments such as streams, etc." 12 
Am. Jur. 2d. Boundaries § 7. 
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2. Numerous Utah Cases With Facts Nearly Identical to the 
Present Case Have Ruled that a Monument Call Controls 
Over a Course and Distance, 
Utah law is clear that when a course and distance call is inconsistent with a specific 
call to a monument, the call to the monument must prevail. See, e.g., Mahas v. 
Rindlisbacher, 808 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1990); Williams v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978); 
Scott v. Hansen, All P.2d 525 (Utah 1966); Henrie v. Hyer, 70 P.2d 154,157 (Utah 1937); 
and Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 80 P. 382, 386 (Utah 1905). Khalsa's attempt to 
distinguish these cases fails. 
InMahas v. Rindlisbacher, 808 P.2d 1025,1026 (Utah 1990), the property description 
contained the following call: "Southeasterly along said canal to a point North 15 [degrees] 
East 10.18 chains from County Road . . ." (emphasis added). The Mahas Court found that 
the call clearly referenced a boundary that ran along an old canal. Id. at 1027. The only issue 
was whether the call referred to a currently non-existent canal or another canal some 400 feet 
to the north. Id. The court concluded that based upon the evidence, the call referred to an 
old canal that was no longer is existence. Id. Even in dissent, Justice Zimmerman concluded: 
"This is not enough to support a finding that such a canal ever existed, and absent such a 
finding, the call to a canal must be given preference over the metes and bounds and the 
boundary must be settled at the Warren Canal." Id. at 1028 (emphasis added). 
First, Khalsa argues that Mahas is distinguishable because both of the parties deeds 
referenced the call to the canal. As previously set forth, however, because the Wards' 
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purchase and recording preceded Khalsa's purchase and recording by years, Khalsa's rights 
in the property are junior to any interest of the Wards. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the legal 
description in Khalsa's warranty deed omits the call to the Epperson Ditch. Second, Khalsa 
attempts to distinguish between minor differences between two calls. Effectively there is no 
substantive difference between the call as stated in the Ward legal description - "thence 
South 07°54f36M West along a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to the point of beginning" 
- and the Mahas call - "Southeasterly along said canal to a point North 15 [degrees] East 
10.18 chains from County Road . . ." Each call contains a direction of either "South" or 
"Southeasterly" "along" a canal (or ditch) a certain distance to another point. Removing the 
reference to the canal or ditch in either situation would still allow for the surveyor to 
complete the survey. Indeed, this had to have been the case in Mahas because the location 
of the old canal was admittedly unknown. Thus, Khalsa's claim that removing the reference 
to the canal in Mahas makes that legal description "incomplete and incomprehensible" is 
unavailing. 
Next, Khalsa submits that the Williams v. Oldroyd decision is not sufficiently specific 
to justify a meaningful comparison. 581 P.2d 561 (Utah 1979).3 There is nothing unspecific 
about the holding in Williams. The issue in Williams was whether the trial court correctly 
3Khalsa makes the curious argument that the Williams v. Oldroyd decision is 
distinguishable because it involves the interpretation of only one legal description, rather than 
two. Khalsa again mistakenly assumes that his after recorded deed is relevant to a 
determination of what property Ellsworth sold to the Wards in 1978. 
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ruled for the plaintiff when it quieted title to property where a latent ambiguity existed 
between a monument call and a metes and bounds description. Id, at 562. The defendant 
submitted that the trial court erred because it refused to reform the deed on the grounds of 
mutual mistake to include property not described. Id, at 562-63. The Court described its 
holding as follows: 
A latent ambiguity in the deed was discovered when the property was 
surveyed. One of the metes and bounds calls is in conflict with a call to a 
monument: viz., Highway 50 and 6. 
Where there is such ambiguity, monument calls take precedence over 
calls of courses and distances, and the Court applied that rule here. 
Defendants content that the Court, in relying on this rule of construction 
reformed the deed in a manner not intended by the parties, and that it erred in 
not reforming the deed in accordance with defendants' claim, noted ante, of 
the intended description of the parties. 
Applying rules of construction, however, does not constitute 
reformation of a deed. The description is indeed followed. . . . 
Id, at 562-63. There is nothing confusing or unspecific about this holding. The Williams 
Court simply reaffirmed the trial court's decision that quieted title to a monument call 
(Highway 50 and 6) that was in conflict with a metes and bounds description. The Williams 
case is directly on point, and requires that the trial court's decision be upheld quieting title 
to the Wards in the Epperson Ditch as the eastern boundary of their property. 
Khalsa submits that the Utah Supreme Court' s Scott v. Hansen decision is inapplicable 
because it involved a question of whether a county road referred to as the boundary ran in a 
straight line as shown on the county map, or a meandering road as actually existed. 422 P.2d 
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525 (Utah 1966). There is no legitimate basis to distinguish the Scott decision from this case. 
Indeed, the legal description and depiction of the disputed area in Scott v. Hansen is 
remarkably similar to the Wards' legal description - "westerly along the south side of said 
road 80 rods more or less" to the said quarter section line. Id. at 528. As in this case, it was 
undisputed that the metes and bounds description was consistent with a straight line and 
inconsistent with a meandering one. The Scott v. Hansen Court ruled "the conclusion seems 
clear " . . . "the reference was to the county road as it actually existed and was observable by 
the parties involved, rather than to the theoretical county road shown by the straight line on 
the county plat." Id. The Court explained its reasoning as follows: 
[F]ixed monuments or markers of a permanent nature which can be definitely 
identified and located take precedence over calls of courses or distances, or 
plats, or amounts of acreage. This is so because it is reasonable to assume that 
the parties are more apt to be familiar with such monuments or markers than 
with precise measurements, or with recorder's plats; consequently, giving 
precedence to the call to such a monument or marker results in less possibility 
of error and a greater likelihood of giving effect to the intent of the parties, 
(internal citations omitted). 
Id. at 527-28. 
The trial court in this case correctly relied upon these well founded Utah cases when 
it ruled in favor of the Wards, quieting title in the Epperson Ditch as the boundary of their 
property. 
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D. The Discrepancy Between the Acreage Reference and the Actual 
Area Conveyed is Inconsequential. 
Khalsa also cites the fact that the acreage referenced after the Wards' legal description 
(6.31 acres) is slightly less than the property actually conveyed as evidence of an intent not 
to create the Epperson Ditch as the boundary. References to amounts of acreage conveyed, 
however, are so imprecise that they are they are given even less weight of intention than 
course and distance calls. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held in Scott v. Hansen 
that of the rules of construction, "[o]ne of these is that fixed monuments or markers of a 
permanent nature which can be definitely identified and located take precedence over calls 
of courses or distances, or plats, or amounts of acreage." 422 P.2d at 527 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, Section 73 of the American Jurisprudence treatise provides as follows: 
Quantity is the least reliable of all descriptive particulars in a conveyance and 
the last to be resorted to. It yields to calls for monuments as well as to other 
courses and distances unless there is a clear intent to give a certain quantity, 
as would be the case in an attempted equal division of a particular tract. 
12 Am. Jur. 2d. Boundaries § 73 (emphasis added). Therefore, the slight discrepancy in 
acreage referenced after the Wards' legal description cannot control the specific reference 
to the Epperson Ditch as the eastern boundary of the Ward Parcel. 
E. Undisputed Factual Evidence Supports the Finding the Epperson 
Ditch was Intended as the Boundary by the Parties. 
As previously stated, "the intent of the parties at the time of conveyance" is the 
purpose for which the rules of construction exist. Scott v. Hansen, All P.2d at 527. Thus, 
actual evidence of the parties intentions at the time of conveyance is obviously relevant. See, 
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e.g., Williams v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d at 563 (noting that "Of those parties who were privy to 
that deed, only plaintiff gave evidence" . . . "that the parties intended the property as 
described in the deed.") "Upon ascertaining the parties' intention, all other rules of 
construction and interpretation must yield to that intention." 12 Am. Jur. 2d. Boundaries § 2. 
"Furthermore, in the case of doubtful construction as to boundaries, the claim of the party 
in actual possession ought to be maintained." 12 Am. Jur. 2d. Boundaries § 60 (emphasis). 
It is undisputed that when the Wards negotiated the purchase of the Ward parcel with 
Ellsworth in 1978, they agreed with Ellsworth that the eastern boundary would be the 
Epperson Ditch. [R. 158, Jon Ward Affidavit at \ 6; R. 146, Jeff Ward Affidavit at 16.] As 
previously explained, this original intent is only confirmed by the language in their legal 
description describing the eastern boundary as "along a ditch", the natural topography of the 
land, and the Wards' continuous possession of the property since 1978. 
The undisputed facts of this case provide substantial and convincing evidence that 
Ellsworth intended the Epperson Ditch as the boundary between the Ward Parcel and his 
remaining land when he sold them the property in 1978 and described the eastern boundary 
as "along a ditch." 
2. KHALSA'S SUGGESTION THAT THE WARDS' LEGAL 
DESCRIPTION IS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CLOSE 
IS UNTIMELY AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE. 
Khalsa raises for the first time in his appeal an issue about whether or not the Wards' 
legal descriptions would close if the call to "along a ditch" is given effect. The only evidence 
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given in support of Khalsa's motion for summary judgment was Christensen's affidavit, 
together with copies of his purported survey and the parties' warranty deeds. No where in 
his affidavit does Christensen discuss a failure to close defect in the Wards' legal description. 
Rather, he stated that he plotted the Ward Parcel by only using the "course bearings and 
distances". [R. 83, Christensen Affidavit at f^ 5.] Khalsa did not raise this issue below and 
presented no facts to the trial court to support this argument, and thus, has waived any right 
to argue that the trial court erred on this basis. Govert Copier Painting v. Craig Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted) (this court "will not 
consider the facts on appeal when there is no record the trial judge had access to those facts 
when deciding the motion at issue.") Nevertheless, Khalsa's argument in this regard appears 
to simply reiterate his position that the call to "along a ditch" is "extraneous", and that if the 
Epperson Ditch is followed as the boundary, it will conflict with the course and distance call 
therein. These arguments have been fully addressed above. 
3. THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE WARDS. 
Khalsa filed a motion for summary judgment submitting that there were no issues of 
fact precluding summary judgment as to the ownership of the disputed property and asking 
the trial court to look to and construe the legal descriptions as a matter of law. [R. 72-70, 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment]; see Hartman v. Potter, 596 
P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) ("It is the court's duty to construe a deed as it is written, and in 
the final analysis, each instrument must be construed in the light of its own language and 
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peculiar facts.") Moreover, Khalsa failed to adequately dispute any of the Wards' Statement 
of Undisputed Facts filed in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(e) 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue of fact for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, 
if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
U. R. Civ. PRO. RULE 56(e) (emphasis added). See also Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 
P.2d 120, 124-25 (Utah 1994) (stating that party opposing motion for summary judgment 
supported by affidavit has affirmative duty to respond with affidavit or other evidence); D 
& L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (same). 
On appeal, Khalsa argues for the first time that if the Court does not rule in his favor, 
the Court should find that there are issues of fact relating to the intention of the parties. He 
argues that if he loses, the language in the Wards' legal description should be ruled 
ambiguous. While there is a latent conflict between the call to the Epperson Ditch as the 
boundary line and the course and distance call, the rules of construction set forth herein are 
intended to resolve these conflicts. Because both parties moved the trial court for summary 
judgment on the interpretation of the legal descriptions and Khalsa failed to dispute the 
Wards' Statement of Undisputed Facts, the trial court properly ruled that there were no 
disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment. 
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4. IN ANY EVENT, DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT RELATING TO THE 
WARDS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF KHALSA. 
Should this Court for whatever reason reverse the trial court's decision quieting title 
up to the Epperson Ditch in the Wards, summary judgment is inappropriate in favor of 
Khalsa because issues of fact remain as to the Wards' counterclaim for boundary by 
acquiescence. 
Under Utah law there are four elements of boundary by acquiescence: (1) occupation 
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (ii) mutual acquiescence in 
the line as a boundary; (iii) for a period of 20 years; (iv) by adjoining landowners. See, e.g., 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998) (finding all four elements satisfied). The Wards 
should have the opportunity to present proof as to each of these elements. 
The Wards became the owners of their real property on July 4, 1978. They 
immediately took possession of the Ward Parcel, up to the Epperson ditch. Every year since 
1978, the Wards have farmed and cultivated their property up to the Epperson ditch. Thus, 
the Wards occupied the property up to the Epperson Ditch for nearly 25 years without 
disturbance. Clearly, should this Court reverse the trial court's decision, the Wards should 
have an opportunity to present evidence that the adjoining landowners acquiesced in the 
Epperson Ditch as the boundary between their properties. Summary judgment in favor of 
Khalsa, therefore, is inappropriate. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion the trial court's ruling should be upheld. The clear and unambiguous 
cannons of construction and the decisions of Utah courts require that a specific call to a 
monument as a boundary control a conflicting course and distance call. Consequently, the 
call to "along" the Epperson Ditch in the Wards' legal description should be given effect 
over any inferior conflicting call, and this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling quieting 
title to the Wards in the center line of the Epperson Ditch as the eastern boundary of the 
Ward Parcel. 
DATED this J[ day of June, 2004. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Ronald G. Russell 
Justin P. Matkin 
By: ^ _ ^ _ 
/^itorneys for Defendants/Appellees Jeffery F. 
Ward and Jon Q. Ward 
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87 REAL ESTATE 57-3-105 
Part i 
General Provisions 
Section 
57-3-101. Certificate of acknowledgment, proof of execu-
tion, jurat, or other certificate required — 
Notarial acts affecting real property — Right 
to record documents unaffected by subdivision 
ordinances. 
57-3-102. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate 
— Validity of document — Notice of unnamed 
interests — Conveyance by grantee. 
57-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
57-3-104. Certified copies entitled to record in another 
county — Effect. 
57-3-105. Legal description of real property and names and 
addresses required in documents. 
57-3-106. Original documents required — Captions — Leg-
ibility. 
57-3-107. Unenforceable covenants — Definition — Inclu-
sion in recorded document. 
57-3-108. Financing statements not subject to title. 
Part 2 
Master Mortgage and Trust Deeds 
57-3-201. Definitions. 
57-3-202. Recording master mortgage and trust deed — 
Requirements for master form — Indexing by 
county recorder. 
57-3-203. Authorization to incorporate master form by ref-
erence — Referencing a master form — Pro-
hibiting the reference of legal descriptions. 
57-3-204. Constructive notice — Effect as between direct 
parties to mortgage or trust deed. 
57-3-1 to 57-3-12. 
107. 
Renumbered as 
PARTI 
57-3-101 to 57-3-
1998 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
57-3-101. Certificate of acknowledgment, proof of exe-
cution, jurat, or other certificate required — 
Notarial acts affecting real property — Right 
to record documents unaffected by subdivi-
sion ordinances. 
(1) A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or 
of the proof of the execution of any document, or a jurat as 
denned in Section 46-1-2, or other notarial certificate contain-
ing the words "subscribed and sworn" or their substantial 
equivalent, that is signed and certified by the officer taking the 
acknowledgment, proof, or jurat, as provided in this title, 
entitles the document and the certificate to be recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county where the real property is 
located. 
(2) Notarial acts affecting real property in this state shall 
also be performed in conformance with Title 46, Chapter 1, 
Notaries Public Reform Act. 
(3) Nothing in the provisions 6f Title 10, Chapter 9, Part 8, 
Subdivisions, and Title 17, Chapter 27, Part 8, Subdivisions, 
shall prohibit the recording of a document which is otherwise 
entitled to be recorded under the provisions of this chapter. 
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57-3-102. Record imparts notice — Change in interest 
rate — Validity of document — Notice of un-
named interests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, 
or certified copy of a document complying with Section 57-
4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of 
location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing 
statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not 
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the 
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of 
their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change 
in the interest rate in accordance with the terms of an 
agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation 
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document 
provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document 
with respect to the parties to the document and all other 
persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nomi-
nal consideration, names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise 
purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or stating 
the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with 
notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the 
interest granted to him free and clear of all claims not 
disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in 
any other document recorded in accordance with this title that 
sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the inter-
est. 2000 
57-3-103. Effect of failure, to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void 
as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real prop-
erty, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly 
recorded. 1998 
57-3-104. Certified copies entitled to record in another 
county — Effect. 
(1) (a) A document of record in a county recorder's office 
that is certified by the county recorder may be recorded in 
the office of the county recorder of another county. 
(b) The recording of a certified copy in the office of the 
county recorder of another county has the same force and 
effect as if the original document had been recorded in the 
other county. 
(2) A certified copy of a document may not be submitted for 
recording under Subsection (1) in the office of the same county 
recorder tha t issued the certified copy. 2003 
57-3-105. Legal description of real property and names 
and addresses required in documents. 
(1) A document executed after July 1,1983, is entitled to be 
recorded in the office of any county recorder only if the 
document contains a legal description of the real property 
affected. 
(2) (a) A document affecting title to real property presented 
for recording after July 1, 1981, is entitled to be recorded 
in the office of any county recorder only if the document 
contains the names and mailing addresses of the grantees 
in addition to the legal description required under Sub-
section (1). 
(b) The address of the management committee may be 
used as the mailing address of a grantee as required in 
Subsection (2)(a) if the interest conveyed is a timeshare 
interest as defined by Section 57-19-2. 
(3) Each county recorder shall refuse to accept a document 
for recording if it does not conform to the rpmiirpmpr»t« nnrW 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
' 475 P2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. 
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran from 
the date of notice of entry of such judgment, 
rather than from the date of judgment. Buck-
ner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 
288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tblbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 
1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P2d 92 (Utah 1986); 
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277. 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim; counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
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(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively tha$ the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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